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SIEGEL

ARTICLE
Collaborative Decision Making on Climate
Change in the Federal Government
JOSEPH A. SIEGEL *
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1 issued in 2007 revealed the
immediacy of climate change and the urgent need for swift action.
According to the Report, the United States and other
industrialized nations must reduce their emissions by at least
80% below 1990 levels by 2050 and 25-40% below 1990 levels by
2020 to prevent atmospheric carbon concentrations from reaching
a level of 450 parts per million (ppm) and causing the most
dramatic effects of climate change. 2 Recent studies have shown
that the industrialized nations may need to do even better. Since
the issuance of the Fourth Assessment Report, there have been
advances in climate science and many scientists now believe that
Joseph A. Siegel is an Alternative Dispute Resolution Specialist and
Senior Attorney for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 2 Office
in New York and an Adjunct Professor at Pace Law School. The author wishes to
acknowledge Deborah Dalton, David Batson and Elissa Tonkin, of EPA’s conflict
prevention and resolution program, for their invaluable assistance in
contributing to the ideas for this article. The author also expresses gratitude for
the excellent research assistance of Jill Richardson, and deep appreciation for
the support and advice of Sharon Kivowitz. The views expressed in this article
do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. All errors are the responsibility of the author.
1. The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and is
the leading international body for assessment of climate change. See
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/
organization.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP III,
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 MITIGATION 776 (Bert Metz
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/
wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter13.pdf.
*
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the situation is more dire than what was reported by the IPCC. 3
Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman of the IPCC, stated in August
2009 that he personally believes, as a scientist, that the global
atmospheric concentration goal should be 350 ppm, rather than
the less aggressive 450 ppm that formed the basis of the IPCC’s
2007 recommended reduction levels. 4 It is now likely that sea
level rise will be greater than predicted due to a faster melting of
the ice sheets, temperature increases will be far more irreversible
than thought, permafrost will melt faster than projected thereby
releasing more greenhouse gases, and the carbon dioxide
emissions growth rate will track the most pessimistic scenarios
examined by the IPCC. 5
The global findings of the IPCC and others have been
complemented by findings of the U.S. Global Change Research
Program (USGCRP), specific to the United States. According to a
June 2009 report of the USGCRP, the United States is already
experiencing the effects of climate change and such effects are
only expected to worsen. 6 The report revealed that the nation is
already being subjected to “increases in heavy downpours, rising
temperature and sea level, rapidly retreating glaciers, thawing
permafrost, lengthening growing seasons, lengthening ice-free
seasons in the ocean and on lakes and rivers, earlier snowmelt,
and alterations in river flows.” 7 These changes are affecting
everything
from
water
resources
and
transportation
8
infrastructure to human health.
The urgency of the situation cries out for aggressive
strategies. There are two broad approaches necessary to address
the existing and anticipated changes. First, as the IPCC
recommends, industrialized nations need to dramatically reduce
3. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
SINCE THE IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org
/docUploads/Key-Scientific-Developments-Since-IPCC-4th-Assessment.pdf.
4. IPCC Chairman Backs Deep Emissions Cuts, GREENWIRE, Aug. 26, 2009,
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/08/26/archive/6?terms=pachauri+.
5. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3.
6. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROJECT (USGRP), GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo &
Thomas C. Peterson eds., 2009), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/
publications/reports/scientific-assessments/usimpa cts/full-report.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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global emissions of greenhouse gases.
This reduction in
emissions is commonly referred to as mitigation. Second, all
nations need to begin adapting to climate change impacts that
are inevitable and already occurring from historic emissions.
This response to existing and anticipated impacts is commonly
referred to as adaptation.
Pursuing mitigation and adaptation strategies will not be
easy. Climate change impacts and efforts to respond to those
impacts will touch virtually every sector of society and implicate
as wide a range of stakeholders as one can possibly imagine. As a
result, the complexity of crafting mitigation and adaptation
responses is enormous. The challenge faced by policy makers as a
result of this complexity is compounded by the need to swiftly
craft responses in the face of great uncertainty. While there is
broad consensus among scientists about the certainty of humaninduced climate change and many of its global effects, there is
less certainty about the precise timing and scale of those effects
as well as the specific nature of regional impacts and the
effectiveness of proposed solutions. As a result, decision makers
are not likely to succeed in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions
and adapting to climate change unless they design the responses
in a manner that allows for flexibility as experts face rapidly
changing scientific and technical information. It is therefore in
our best interest to draw upon all the resources and knowledge
that exist within the many stakeholder groups involved in the
climate change issue, and to use processes that will result in
efficient and effective actions that are at once resilient and
adaptable. Collaborative decision making can help us achieve
this objective.
This article will discuss the application of collaborative
decision making to climate change. It will focus on opportunities
for the federal government, in particular the Executive Branch,9
to use collaborative decision making when crafting domestic
responses to climate change. While discussions about consultation and coordination between Congress and the President or
international collaborative processes 9 are beyond the scope of this

9. Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental
Lawmaking: a Discourse Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377 (2008) (discussing the
application of deliberative democracy principles to the international climate
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paper, there is historical support for the proposition that
international climate change agreements made by the Executive
Branch, without consulting Congress or obtaining diverse
grassroots support, may be doomed to failure. 10
Part II of this article will describe the general characteristics
of collaborative decision-making and discuss why it has particular
applicability to climate change. Part III will demonstrate that
collaborative decision making on environmental issues is already
integrated within the federal government. Part IV will provide a
framework for considering the range of collaborative processes
and Part V will apply that framework to specific examples of
collaborative processes that have already been used by the federal
government to address climate change. Part VI will discuss some
initial efforts among the federal agencies to foster interagency
collaboration.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CAPACITY
FOR COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKIING AND
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Before discussing why it is important to build capacity within
the federal government for collaborative decision making on
climate change this section will describe the general
characteristics of collaborative decision making.

change arena). For a brief discussion of an international collaborative process,
see infra Part V.C.
10. David B. Hunter, International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities and
Challenges for the Obama Administration, 19 DUKE E NVTL . L. & POL 'Y F. 247,
255 (2009) (referring to the Clinton Administration’s flawed strategy of setting
strong carbon commitments internationally and then using those negotiations to
gain the political support at home to win Congressional ratification); Thomas D.
Peterson, The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States:
Lessons Learned and New Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81, 86-91 (2004)
(discussing the Byrd-Hagel resolution and the Senate’s refusal to ratify an
international climate change treaty after President Clinton signed the Kyoto
Protocol, and the resulting trend by political leadership toward grassroots
approaches and away from top-down imposition of climate change solutions).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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A.

Characteristics of Collaborative Decision Making

1.

Defining Collaborative Decision Making

There are many forms of collaborative processes. The
Association for Conflict Resolution, in its report, Best Practices for
Government Agencies: Guidelines for Using Collaborative
Agreement-Seeking Processes, 11 divides the universe of collaborative processes into three broad categories: (1) those with the
purpose of exchanging information and improving communication
and understanding; (2) those where advice is provided to the
government in the form of opinions or suggestions for action; and
(3) those where agreement is sought and decisions are made with
the government. In the third category alone, the report identifies
twenty-four different terms, including collaborative decision
making, to describe collaborative processes. 12 Many other terms
exist for the remaining two categories and, in many instances,
different meanings are ascribed to the same term. 13
Collaborative decision-making is sometimes referred to as stakeholder involvement, public involvement, public participation,
public-private partnership, deliberative democracy, constructive
engagement, and collaborative problem solving. The varied use of
these terms demands clear definition when designing and
describing processes. 14
For purposes of this article, collaborative decision making
will be considered broadly and is characterized by a range of
processes, some agreement-seeking and some not, in which the
government involves outside stakeholders in the government’s
decision making. In some cases, where the government has no
greater authority than other stakeholders, collaborative decision
making can involve an equal partnership among the
11. Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best Practices for Government Agencies:
Guidelines for Using Collaborative Agreement-Seeking Processes, http://acrnet.
org/acrlibrary/more.php?id=13_0_1_0_M (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
12. Id.
13. DEBORAH DALTON & PHILIP J. HARTER, BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH
CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION 6, http://www.epa.gov/innovation/collabora
tion/betterdecisions.pdf (describing how consultation and collaboration may be
referred to, among other names, as “stakeholder involvement, public
involvement, public participation, public-private partnership, deliberative
democracy, constructive engagement, and collaborative problem solving”).
14. Id.
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stakeholders, including the government; or the government can
serve in a supporting role to facilitate efforts of outside
stakeholders in their own decision making processes.
2.

General Attributes of Collaborative Decision
Making

Collaborative decision making holds great promise for
addressing difficult public policy issues. There are a number of
general attributes that are worth considering at the outset before
discussing why decisions on climate change are uniquely qualified
to benefit from collaborative approaches.
Collaborative decision making can provide a forum for broad
participation by multiple stakeholders, facilitate cooperative
learning among the participants, and result in selection of the
best policy choices. 15 It ensures an opening for group creativity
and innovation that is often lacking in traditional regulatory
processes. Collaborative decision making can be particularly
powerful in the context of complex public policy issues, such as
climate change, because it can create a dialogue based on hope 16
that can transcend the despair that leads to inaction. 17 By
promoting ownership and empowerment among the stakeholders,
collaborative decision-making can increase the likelihood of
prompt action while reducing the likelihood of litigation. 18 While
15. Annecoos Wiersema, Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law
and Goals in the Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239,
1252-53 (2008) (discussing collaborative decision making in the ecosystem
management context).
16. R. McGreggor Cawley, Still Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: Some
Thoughts on Hope, Progress, and Politics, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1,
13 (2003).
17. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES
148-150 (2009), http://www.apa.org/releases/climate-change.pdf (arguing that
despair and other emotions, such as fear, can affect policy support for climate
change action). See also Edna Sussman, Climate Change Framing and Social
Marketing: The Influences that Persuade, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2009)
(discussing the importance of understanding human behavior and the benefits of
social marketing to garner the necessary public sentiment for taking action on
climate change).
18. NAT’L POLICY CONSENSUS CTR, INTEGRATING COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES:
PUBLIC DELIBERATION WITH STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES 1 (2007), http://www.policy
consensus.org/publications/reports/integrating_activities.pdf; but see Michael
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collaborative decision-making may appear to be quite resource
intensive because it often requires investment of more time upfront, it can ultimately produce results faster and with fewer
resources than traditional processes. 19 As a result of up-front
efforts that engender buy-in from multiple stakeholders, decisions
made through collaborative processes are more lasting and more
likely to be implemented than decisions made via traditional
processes. 20
Collaborative decision-making does not mean that the
government cedes its authority to make decisions. It retains
ultimate authority to impose its own solutions using traditional
processes. In fact, collaborative decisions may actually thrive
when the government’s authorities are clear and purposeful. 21
Likewise, stakeholders retain their right to any alternatives to
the collaborative process that are otherwise available to them. 22
Collaborative decision-making is not a panacea alternative to
traditional environmental regulation and will not always be the
appropriate means of making environmental decisions. 23 It does
not guarantee that cooperation among stakeholders will come
easily nor does its adoption mean that resolution of complex
McCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental Public
Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (2000) (arguing that collaborative decision making
can take more time than traditional processes and might not reduce the
likelihood of litigation).
19. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1997) (referring to EPA findings regarding benefits of
negotiated rulemaking).
20. NAT’L POLICY CONSENSUS CTR., supra note 18, at 1.
21. Kirk Emerson & Peter Murchie, Collaborative Governance and Climate
Change: Opportunities for Public Administration, in THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC SERVICE AROUND THE WORLD:
THE MINNOWBROOK PERSPECTIVE 141-61 (Rosemary O’Leary, Soonhee Kim &
David Van Slyke eds., forthcoming 2009).
22. In any agreement-seeking process, both government and nongovernmental stakeholders will be able to most effectively participate if they
have a clear understanding of their best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA). See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books
1991) (1983). Likewise, in collaborative processes that do not seek agreement, it
is important for stakeholders to understand their alternatives to participation.
23. Craig Anthony Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic:
Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 45 (2004) (noting the
benefits of “collaborative problem-solving” while recognizing that there are
limits to its use as an alternative to environmental law).
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issues will be achieved. However, it is an important option to be
considered, particularly for intractable problems like climate
change, where government needs to take advantage of a wide
range of opportunities for making progress. The following section
discusses why collaborative decision making is particularly well
suited for addressing climate change.
B.

Collaborative Decision Making as a Strategy to
Address Climate Change

The federal government is at a turning point on how it will
reckon with climate change. The Obama Administration has
taken bold steps to ensure that the issue remains front and center
on the national agenda and that progress is made on a response.
In the first nine months after President Obama’s inauguration,
the Administration, among other things, set in motion a process
for establishing vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards and
stringent fuel economy standards, 24 issued a proposed and final
Greenhouse Gas Reporting rule, 25 reversed the prior
Administration’s denial 26 of California’s request for a waiver
under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles, 27 responded to the Supreme Court decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA 28 by proposing an endangerment finding

24. Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,904 (May 26, 2009)
(proposing standards for renewable fuels). See also U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, Final Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/endangerment/downloads/FinalFindings.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2009).
25. Proposed Rule on Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed.
Reg. 16,448 (Apr. 10, 2009). See also U. S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Final
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
26. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
27. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009).
28. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, 29 and initiated a
rulemaking process to regulate greenhouse gases from stationary
sources. 30 The President has also championed cap-and-trade
legislation and is prepared to use the Clean Air Act as a backstop
if Congress does not take action. 31
Despite these efforts, after eight years of relative inaction on
climate change by the Bush Administration, there is a major task
at hand to build capacity on climate change science, law and
policy, education, and technology. There is also a great need to
build capacity on collaborative decision-making and public
involvement on climate change. This can be accomplished, in
part, by increasing the numbers of climate change stakeholder
representatives and neutrals who are skilled in the process of
collaborative decision-making.
While building process capacity may not always flow from the
need to build substantive capacity on any particular environmental issue, many characteristics of the climate change problem
suggest a need for process-oriented capacity-building now. 32
Among the factors that call for collaborative decision making are:
(1) the need for adaptive management in the face of uncertainty;
(2) the benefits of drawing upon the significant expertise gained
by many state and local governments during the years of federal
government inaction; (3) the expectation that a climate bill will
necessitate intensive rulemaking; (4) the federal government’s
unique role in responding to natural disasters; (5) the
international trans-boundary nature of impacts and solutions;
and (6) the anticipated stress on infrastructure and resources due
to climate change. A number of these factors also reflect the
importance of the federal government as an agent for
collaborative decision making. Each of these six factors are
29. Proposed Endangerment and Cause and Contribute Findings for
Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009).
30. EPA PROPOSED RULE, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND
TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE (2009), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/
documents/GHGTailoringProposal.pdf.
31. See Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Prefers Congress to EPA in Tackling
Climate--Browner, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/cwire/2009/02/23/23climatewire-obama-prefers-congress-to-epa-when-itcomes-t-9800.html.
32. Some of these factors apply to collaboration even where the federal
government is not a party but many have specific import for the federal
government as a vehicle for, or participant in, a collaborative effort.
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discussed below. While they are by no means exclusive, these
factors represent some of the most compelling reasons for why
collaborative decision making should be embraced as a process
solution to climate change.
1.

Decision Making in the Face of Uncertainty:
The Need for Adaptive Management

Climate change planning is fraught with uncertainty. First,
on the global scale, despite an already existing robust body of
data on climate change impacts, there is uncertainty about the
precise timing and extent of those impacts. Additionally,
scientists are constantly refining models and other predictive
tools. The trend in new projections has been toward worsening
impacts; 33 and if this trend continues, policy makers may find the
need to revise their mitigation planning in a more aggressive
manner. Second, while scientists have made significant advances
in developing more reliable downscale models for regional and
local impact projections, great uncertainty still remains. As a
result, efforts to adapt to climate change will need to be revisited
and updated frequently. Third, technological and other solutions
will have to be selected and implemented without complete
certainty about their effectiveness because we are in a race
against time. Once implemented, these solutions might, in some
cases, fail to help us mitigate or adapt and, in other cases, be
rejected because they result in new environmental problems.
Given these three areas of uncertainty, decisions on climate
change will have to be fashioned with the recognition that there
may be a large range of probabilistic outcomes. 34 In addition,
political will to take action appears to be on the rise 35 and can be
expected to rise further as the voting public begins to experience,
and gain awareness of actual climate change impacts. 36 As a
result, more aggressive regulatory measures, which are
33. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3.
34. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61.
35. See Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Oct. 22, 2009, http://peoplepress.org/report/556/global-warming (describing how global warming awareness
has dropped since the 2008 presidential campaign).
36. Educating and engaging the public will be a key element in achieving
support for critical government action. See generally Sussman, supra note 17.
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unthinkable today, may become possible. Given the scientific,
technological, and political uncertainty, decisions on climate
change mitigation and adaptation require a significant level of
flexibility. A constant stream of new information will create the
need to be nimble as policy makers find cause to update decisions.
As such, decisions must be made in an experimental context with
the recognition that some actions will fail 37 and opportunities for
more effective options will arise.
Collaborative decision-making can “foster innovative,
prompt, and efficient responses to changing conditions” and
therefore provide the flexibility needed to adapt. 38 The term
“adapt” in this context is distinguishable from the more typical
usage of climate change adaptation, for example, by building a
bigger sea wall. Instead, it refers to adapting our “management”
of the problem, for example, by revisiting over time how high the
sea wall needs to be. This concept applies to decisions made
about both mitigation and adaptation and is often referred to as
“adaptive management.” Collaborative decision-making can be
initiated with the goal of designing an adaptive management
strategy. It can also create the necessary trust and shared
experience among stakeholders to successfully carry out the
ongoing decisions necessary for adaptive management.
The basic premise of adaptive management is that, as
stakeholders obtain more information about a problem, they can
adapt the way they manage the problem. This feedback loop
allows the stakeholders to make decisions in the face of
uncertainty with the recognition that they will modify decisions
as they learn more. 39 Adaptive management is used in the
resource management world as a way to deal with problems in
large complex systems. As such, the approach would appear to
have significant import for the problem of climate change. 40 In
37. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61 (noting that “we will need
to view governance more as an experiment, and less as a predictable machine”).
38. Nancy P. Spyke, Heeding the Call: Making Sustainability a Matter of
Pennsylvania Law, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 729, 760 (2005).
39. See Richard Roos-Collins, A Perpetual Experiment to Restore and Manage
Silicon Valley's Guadalupe River, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 291 (2005)
(describing an adaptive management process).
40. See Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Adaptive Management as an
Operational Approach for Resource Management Agencies, 3 CONSERVATION
ECOLOGY 2, 8 (1999), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/
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fact, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program recognizes
adaptive management as a strategy for dealing with the
uncertainty of climate change: “[t]his method [adaptive
management] supports managers in taking action today using the
best available information while also providing the possibility of
ongoing future refinements through an iterative learning
process.” 41
The principle of adaptive management can be applied to
aspects of climate change other than resource management. For
example, it could prove useful when considering controversial
technological fixes, such as carbon capture and sequestration, for
mitigation purposes. While the precautionary principle 42 would
favor acquiring sufficient knowledge before introducing a new
technology into an ecosystem, adaptive management would
recognize both the pressing need to take action and the potential
for harm to an ecosystem when introducing the new technology. 43
The potential for harm arises because decision makers and
stakeholders cannot wait for all questions to be answered before
they take action. 44 Thus, they must weigh the amount of
art8/; Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global
Climate Change: an Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB.
L. REV. 833 (2009).
41. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GlOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATESENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 3 (2008), http://downloads.climatescien
ce.gov/sap/sap4-4/sap4-4-final-report-all.pdf.
42. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Full Text of the
Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/item
s/1349.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). In discussing the issue of climate change,
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at
the lowest possible cost.
Id. art. 3. See also Edna Sussman & David Major, Fostering Progress Through
Law and Regulation, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (noting that the
precautionary principle suggests that reasonable, prudent, and feasible
measures should not be deferred pending scientific unanimity).
43. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Maieusis Through a Gated Membrane:
"Getting the Science Right" in Public Decision-Making, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373,
434 (2007).
44. Sussman & Major, supra note 42.
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uncertainty they are willing to tolerate against the need for
prompt action and determine how to manage that uncertainty
and risk once an action has gone forward.
Successful implementation of adaptive management
therefore requires mutual trust given the associated risk and
uncertainty of experimentation. 45 Collaborative processes can
help to build and maintain the trust among stakeholders needed
for ultimate success given that there may be failures along the
way.
Moreover, collaborative processes can also provide a
communication and process framework for bringing the same
stakeholders back to the table as new information arises. Given
the inherent uncertainty in fashioning climate change responses,
collaborative decision making is more likely to result in selection
of decisions that are better in the first instance, require fewer
revisions, and are more adaptable when revisions are necessary.
2.

Local, State, and Regional Action

Another factor that makes climate change planning well
suited for collaborative decision-making is the important role that
many states and local governments have already played in
fashioning solutions. In the vacuum of eight years of federal
inaction, states have taken the lead on climate change. As of
April 2009, thirty-five states had completed or were poised to
complete climate action plans, twenty states had adopted
greenhouse gas reduction targets, and seventeen states had
developed or were developing mandatory greenhouse gas
reporting rules. 46 In addition, thirty-three states were
participants or observers in three major regional cap-and-trade
initiatives: (1) the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI); (2)
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI); and (3) the Midwest
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. 47 Strong motivation to take
45. Beth C. Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, and Management
in the Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 203 (2009).
46. American Clean Energy And Security Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Energy & Com. on H.R.2454, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (testimony of Bill
Becker, Executive Dir. of Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies), [hereinafter
Testimony] available at http://www.4cleanair.org/Documents/WaxmanMarkey
BillNACAATestimonyFINAL042209.pdf.
47. For a current map of the states involved in these initiatives, see Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Regional Initiatives, http://www.pewclimate.
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action on climate change also was experienced at the local level.
More than 900 mayors signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement and pledged to meet or beat Kyoto
Protocol targets in their communities. 48
As discussed earlier, 49 the Obama Administration has clearly
signaled its intention to take aggressive steps on climate change
and Congress is closer to a climate bill than it has ever been in
the past. However, the traditional model where the federal
government makes decisions and the states implement those
decisions is not likely to be successful. States have already
invested a great deal of time and resources into fashioning their
own individual responses to climate change 50 and will not want to
be cast aside. Moreover, the federal government can benefit from
lessons learned at the state and local level. The most significant
import of state innovation on climate change may not be the
emissions reductions they have achieved, but rather their ability
to inform decisions on a national program. 51 As “laboratories of
innovation,” future state strategies can continue to inform federal
policy and be a basis for revising federal programs. 52 In addition,
states exercise primary authority in many areas, such as; land
use, building codes, municipal waste, water supply, and
transportation planning. 53 Therefore, a collaborative approach to
comprehensive greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation will
org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm (last visited Nov.
26, 2009).
48. Testimony, supra note 46, at 3.
49. See supra Part II.B.
50. Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or
Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save
our Public Lands?, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 449, 456-61 (2008)
(arguing that collaboration management of public lands is more likely to avoid
friction with state government than the traditional “dominant federal” model,
with its centralized, coercive control over state action).
51. Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States:
A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL . L.J. 54, 56-57 (2005).
52. NAT’L ASS’N OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES, CONFERENCE MATERIALS FOR
DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES IN FEDERAL GLOBAL WARMING
LEGISLATION 10 (2008), http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/GWConferenceMat
erials.pdf.
53. Robert B. McKinstry Jr., et al., The New Climate World: Achieving
Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control Through
State Planning Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 767, 771 (2009).
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serve to maximize the relative opportunities of the states and
federal government to address climate change.
As the federal government goes forward, it can also benefit
from lessons learned by the states on the process by which they
have generated the state climate change action plans. The state
plans were developed using “bottom-up stakeholder and
technical-work-group-driven processes.” 54 Thus, the state
experience in developing a response to climate change has been
one rooted in collaborative decision making. This experience will
likely inform state expectations for how the federal government
will interact with state, local, and other stakeholders. 55
3.

Legislation

It is likely that Congress will pass some form of climate
change legislation in the near future. Due to the pressing need to
take aggressive action quickly, the legislation will probably
require a considerable amount of federal rulemaking within a
short period of time. It is not likely that the legislation will
include many statutory provisions specifically compelling
collaborative decision-making. 56 While there has been a great
54. Id. at 777. Many of these process-related innovations were developed by
the Center for Climate Strategies. See Center for Climate Strategies, U.S.
Climate Policy Action, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (last visited Nov. 26,
2009).
55. This expectation is reflected in a discussion paper of the National
Association of Clean Air Agencies. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES,
supra note 52, at 19 (noting “[a]s part of implementing a national GHG program
. . . state and local experts could form an advisory body that provides real-time
guidance to the implementing federal agency (likely EPA); such guidance would
be used to improve program implementation”).
56. One example of support for collaborative processes is in the Clean Energy
Jobs and American Power Act, proposed by Senators Boxer and Kerry. See S.
Doc. No. 111-1733 (2009). The relevant language is found not in a rulemaking
provision, but in a section related to whether developing countries can
participate in an offset program for reduced deforestation. To be eligible,
developing countries must have a “national policy for consultations with, and
full participation of, all stakeholders, especially indigenous and forestdependent communities, in its design, planning, and implementation of
activities, whether at the national or local level, to reduce deforestation in the
country.” S. Doc. No. 111-1733, § 744(e)(2)(c)(v) (2009). It is also likely that there
will be a federal coordinating body, like a National Climate Service, in the
climate legislation that emerges from Congress. See infra Part VI. For an
example of legislation involving collaborative decision-making in another
environmental context, see Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Lessons in
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deal of debate and discussion over the last several years about the
design of a cap-and-trade program and other aspects of a climate
change bill, little attention has been paid to the institutional or
organizational approach to implementing such legislation. 57
Collaborative decision-making could help to achieve successful
implementation of rulemaking under a climate bill.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act, 58 passed by
the House of Representatives, would require federal agencies to
promulgate many regulations in a short period of time. Under
Title III, “Reducing Global Warming Pollution,” alone, as much as
sixty-five regulations would have to be promulgated and, in most
cases, the regulations will have to be completed within the first
two years of enactment. 59 This is a huge task particularly
because of the complexity of the issues. Traditional rulemaking
can result in an adversarial game in which information becomes a
weapon rather than a tool for decision-making and is used to
thwart and delay agency action. 60 In order to quickly develop
rules that are not only likely to be effective but also survive
litigation, the federal government can benefit from applying the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act 61 or similar stakeholder processes.
There are many stakeholders, including states and local
government that have a great deal of experience to lend to
climate change rulemaking. The federal government can best
Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV.
893, 912-13 (2009) (discussing special legislation that requires collaborative
decision making for certain restoration activities in the Everglades and in the
Grand Canyon).
57. Barry G. Rabe, Commentary, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 787 (2008).
58. American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
331 (2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives, June 26, 2009).
59. See ROGER R. MARTELLA, AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF
2009: REGULATORY RULE MAKING PROVISIONS (2009), http://www.sidley.com/
files/Event/c878736b-0f8e4a369b45d6e7b2b991f3/Presentatiocn/EventAttachme
nt/c4393717-179c-46d2-ba38-104dcecfff13/ACESA%20table.pdf (noting in Sidley
and Austin’s analysis that some of the sixty-five rulemaking actions could be
potentially grouped together).
60. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for
the New Congress and Administration: Panel II—Setting priorities: Framing
Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL . L.J. 75, 80-81
(2008) (arguing that an “information roadblock” is pervasive in environmental
regulation).
61. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4976
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1990)).
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leverage the expertise of these stakeholders through collaborative
processes.
4.

Natural Disasters and the Federal Government’s
Unique Role

Another factor that suggests the importance of using
collaborative decision making to address climate change is the
impact from anticipated increases in extreme weather events and
natural weather related disasters. As the effects of climate
change become more widespread, the federal government will
increasingly be called upon to take action to respond to those
effects. Catastrophic weather events, like Hurricane Katrina,
will become more prevalent. 62 State government officials will not
always have the resources to address the needs of their citizens.
In addition to providing resources such as disaster relief funds
and personnel, the federal government can act as a convener or
facilitator of collaborative processes to assist with the many
decisions that will have to be made among multiple stakeholders
regarding repair, rebuilding, resiliency, and relocation of
displaced people.
5.

International Engagement

The global nature of climate change suggests the importance
of collaborative decision making on the international level. The
climate change crisis cannot be properly addressed without
international engagement from the United States. While some
state and regional organizations have achieved limited success
with international outreach, 63 there is little dispute that the
global crisis of climate change cannot be properly addressed
without participation of the federal government. Indeed, many
significant emitters among the developing nations will not agree
62. See U.S. Global Change Research Program, Hurricanes: A Compendium
of Hurricane Information, Hurricanes & Climate Change, http://www.usgcrp.gov
/usgcrp/links/hurricanes.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (predicting that
hurricanes will become more intense because of warming sea surface
temperatures).
63. See Western Climate Initiative, WCI Partners and Observers Map,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners-and-observers-map (last
visited Nov. 26, 2009) (the Western Climate Initiative includes four Canadian
provinces).
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to an international framework unless the U.S. government has
engaged in the process. International efforts by the United
States on a broad scale, as in a post-Kyoto agreement, 64 as well
as on a smaller bilateral 65 or project-specific multilateral scale, 66
can benefit from collaborative approaches. 67
6. Resources and Infrastructure
Climate change will stress existing resources and
infrastructure and require new and creative uses of existing
resources to meet the basic needs of the American people.
Collaborative decision making can be an effective tool to help
address these challenges. For example, water resource impacts
from climate change may require all levels of government to
reassess current institutional structures involved in our Nation’s
water supply and seek new collaborative arrangements. 68 The
American West and other parts of the country are projected to
experience severe drought, early springtime water runoff, and
more competition for limited resources.
Existing compacts
designed to ensure adequate water supply to the Western states
may be in jeopardy as water resources become scarcer and

64. See Cop15, Copenhagen, U.N. Climate Change Conference,
http://en.cop15.dk/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (stating the Conference of the
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change will meet in
Copenhagen December 7-18, 2009 to consider a post-Kyoto agreement).
65. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on
Climate Change, Energy and the Environment between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,
July 28, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
126802.pdf (signed by U.S. State Department, agreement between China and
the U.S.).
66. See infra Part V.C.3 (regarding the U.S. engagement with other countries
in the Methane to Markets program).
67. A discussion of collaborative opportunities at the December 2009 15th
Conference of the Parties (COP-15) meeting in Copenhagen is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Cop15, supra note 64; Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, International, http://www.pewclimate.org/international (last
visited Nov. 26, 2009).
68. Bret C. Birdsong, Collaboration and the Colorado River: Seances,
Cienegas, and Slop: Can Collaboration Save the Delta?, 8 NEV. L.J. 853, 867-68
(2008) (discussing collaborative efforts to allocate waters in the Colorado River
basin).
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competition grows between states. 69
Stronger federal
government involvement may be necessary to address water
resource concerns just as it was to address trans-boundary air
pollution. The federal government may be able to serve as
convener or facilitator in seeking agreement between the states
affected by shrinking water supplies.
The federal government may need to serve in a similar
capacity, using collaborative decision making, with respect to
changes in our energy supply and transmission. The U.S.
Department of Energy has already launched a collaborative
project with the Western Governors Association to designate
zones for renewable energy projects and plan for power
transmission from those zones to western load centers. 70 The
federal government may also need to play a role in addressing
potential disruption to existing energy supply distribution
systems in the United States due to weather related impacts from
climate change. 71 There will likely be increasing opportunities
for the federal government to use collaborative decision making
in other resource and infrastructure contexts such as transportation, grazing rights, pipeline access, and natural resource
management, among others.
III. SUPPORT FOR COLLABORATIVE DECISION
MAKING WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Collaborative decision-making thrives in an atmosphere of
transparency and open government. This section first highlights
the Obama Administration’s shift to a more transparent and
collaborative approach to governing; and then provide back-

69. Robert W. Adler, Symposium Essay: Revisiting the Colorado River
Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19 (2008)
(arguing that climate change is a reason to reconsider the Colorado River
Compact).
70. Lynne Gillette et al., Using Collaboration to Address Renewable Energy
Siting Challenges, 56 FED. LAWYER 54 (2009).
71. See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE IN THE U.S., http://www.climatescience.gov/
Library/sap/sap4-5/final-report/sap4-5-final-chap3.pdf (discussing how the
effects from weather disruptions and warming temperatures on the U.S. energy
infrastructure could be large in some localities, including the Gulf Coast, the
Gulf of Mexico, and Alaska).
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ground on the use of collaborative decision making in the
environmental context.
A.

The Obama Administration:
Placing a New Emphasis on Transparency, Open
Government, and Collaboration

Collaborative decision-making is part of a broader movement
to rethink the way government conducts its business 72 in order to
afford greater public involvement in government decisions. New
approaches have been implemented to give the public greater
opportunity to become involved in the decisions made by their
government. President Obama has championed a philosophy of
open government and on his first day in office, he issued the
Transparency
and
Open
Government
Memorandum
(Memorandum) for the heads of federal executive departments
and agencies. 73 The Memorandum ushered in a new era in which
the federal government is charged with being transparent,
participatory, and collaborative; 74 a marked contrast to the prior
This shift in the federal government’s
Administration. 75
72. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61 (discussing several streams
of theory and practice of public decision making and management that have led
to the emergence of collaborative governance).
73. Memorandum from the President of the U.S. to the Heads of Executive
Dep’ts and Agencies on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685
(Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency Memorandum], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/. The
President also issued, on his first day in office, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) Memorandum. See Memorandum on the FOIA from the President of the
U.S. to the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683 (Jan. 21,
2009), [hereinafter FOIA Memorandum], available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the_press_office/FreedomofInformationAct/. The FOIA Memorandum
requires the federal government to return to the Clinton-era presumption in
favor of disclosure; see Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www
.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm. The memorandum takes
“affirmative steps to make information public” and does not “wait for specific
requests from the public.” FOIA Memorandum, supra. This approach was
affirmed in a Memorandum issued by Attorney General Eric Holder on March
19, 2009. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march 2009.pdf.
74. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 73.
75. Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror:
The Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. &
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approach to governing is not only intended to promote
accountability and engage citizens in the work of their
government, but it is expected to foster increased effectiveness
and improved decision-making. 76 The Memorandum encourages
collaborative decision making, and other public involvement
approaches, by instructing federal agencies to use “innovative
tools, methods, and systems to cooperate among themselves,
across all levels of government, and with organizations,
businesses, and individuals in the private sector.” 77 Another sign
of the President’s commitment to stakeholder involvement is the
new Office of Public Engagement launched by President Obama
on May 11, 2009 “to engage as many Americans as possible in the
difficult work of changing this country.” 78 This philosophy of
open government has also found its way into the environmental
arena. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator
Lisa Jackson stated the following in her initial Memo to EPA
Employees: “I pledge that we will carry out the work of the
POL'Y 479 (2006) (concluding that the September 11, 2001 attacks provided a
pretext for the Bush Administration’s preference for secrecy in carrying out the
business of government); Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power,
Information, and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
247, 256-58 (2008) (discussing the lack of transparency in the Bush
Administration and noting how it contrasted with the Clinton Administration’s
approach to the Freedom of Information Act).
76. See Kirtley, supra note 75; Setty, supra note 75. In the Transparency and
Open Government Memorandum, the President directed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Chief Technology Officer, and General
Services Administration, to make recommendations within 120 days regarding
issuance of an Open Government Directive. The OMB thereupon launched the
Open Government Initiative on May 21, 2009, to involve the public in making
the recommendations. See The White House, Open Government Initiative,
Transparency and Open Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2009). Following a three-phase electronic public process, draft
recommendations are currently being reviewed by government officials for
implementation of the Memorandum. See Executive Office of the President
Office of the U.S., http://www.mixedink.com/OpenGov/ (last visited Nov. 26,
2009).
77. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 73.
78. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sect’y, President
Obama Launches Office of Public Engagement, A New Name, Mission for White
House Liaison Office (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/President-Obama-Launches-Office-of-Public-Engagement/ (this
office replaced the Office of Public Liaison and will have a new focus on
obtaining ideas and information from the American people through public
events and on-line interaction).
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Agency in public view so that the door is open to all interested
parties and that there is no doubt why we are acting and how we
arrived at our decisions.” 79
Transparency and open government has been a key tool in
building consensus on state climate action plans. 80 It is becoming
an important element of federal collaborative decision making on
climate change as well. Transparency figures into a range of
specific processes that are being initiated by the federal
government to ensure greater stakeholder involvement. 81
B.

Collaborative Processes in the Federal
Government on Environmental Issues: A
Foundation for Collaborative Decision Making on
Climate Change

Although the Obama Administration has established a new
emphasis on transparency and open government, collaborative
decision-making is not new to the federal government and there
is existing support for it, in particular, in the environmental
The federal government’s experience with
arena. 82
environmental collaborative decision making provides an
excellent foundation for its use in the context of climate change.
One of the most significant events to stimulate environmental collaborative decision-making in the federal government
was Congress’ enactment of the Environmental Policy and
Conflict Resolution Act of 1998. This Act established the U.S.
Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution (IECR). 83 IECR’s
mission includes improving environmental decision-making in the
federal government by increasing the capacity of agencies and
other affected stakeholders to engage in environmental conflict
79. Memorandum from EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson to EPA (Jan. 23,
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/administrator/memotoemployees.html.
80. Peterson, supra note 10, at 86-91 (2004).
81. See infra Parts IV-V (for discussion about a continuum of collaborative
processes options and specific examples of those process options).
82. See generally Joseph A. Siegel, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Environmental Enforcement Cases: A Call for Enhanced Assessment and Greater
Use, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 189-96 (2007) (discussing federal statutory,
policy and institutional support for environmental conflict resolution).
83. Environmental Policy and Conflict Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-156, § 2, 112 Stat. 9 (1998) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5609
(2000)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8

22

SIEGEL

2009-10]

COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING

279

resolution. 84 Environmental conflict resolution is defined by
IECR to include collaborative problem solving. 85 IECR meets
with senior agency staff quarterly to provide guidance and
facilitate information exchange on collaboration and other forms
of environmental conflict resolution within the federal
government. 86
Several federal agencies have their own institutional
structures to support collaborative decision making on
environmental issues. For example, EPA established the Conflict
Prevention and Resolution Center in 1999, 87 the Department of
Interior established the Collaborative Action and Dispute
Resolution Center in 2001, 88 and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission established a similar service in 1999. 89
In addition to institutional structures such as IECR and
agency environmental conflict resolution centers, there have been
important policy developments to support collaborative decision
making in the federal government. Building on IECR’s mission, a
joint Memorandum issued by the Office of Management and
Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality in 2005
instructed federal agencies to employ collaborative problem
solving and, in recognition of the potential for improved outcomes
and reduced costs, asked agency leadership to “recognize and
support needed upfront investments in collaborative processes.” 90
84. U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, About Us, http://www.ecr.gov/
HowWeWork/AboutUs.aspx#overview (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
85. U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, Definition & Principles,
http://www.ecr.gov/Basics/Principles.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
86. See U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, Quarterly Interagency ECR
Forums, http://www.ecr.gov/Resources/FederalECRPolicy/QuarterlyInteragency
Forums.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (the quarterly meeting agendas and
summaries can be found at this site).
87. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Conflict Prevention and Resolution
Center, http://www.epa.gov/ adr/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (EPA
engaged in environmental conflict resolution for many years prior to
establishment of the Center).
88. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Collaborative Action and Dispute
Resolution, http://www.doi.gov/cadr/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
89. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution,
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/adr.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
90. Memorandum from Joshua Bolten, Director, Office of Management &
Budget, and James L. Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Environmental.
Quality, to Secretary Administrator, (Nov. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/OMB_CEQ _Joint_Statement.pdf. See also Exec. Order
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In reality, many federal agencies have policies to ensure that
public involvement, consultation, and collaborative decision
making is part of the way they do business with respect to
environmental issues. 91 The Forest Service views collaborative
decision making in the context of natural resource management,
wherein “groups with different interests come together to address
management issues across a large geographic region such as a
forest, watershed, or landscape.” 92 The Department of Interior
(DOI) has adopted the “4 Cs” representing conservation through
cooperation, communication, and consultation. 93 The DOI
emphasizes “cooperation” to foster voluntary action, partnerships,
and collaboration, “communication” to ensure accountability,
transparency, and innovation through exchange of ideas, and
“consultation” with those who possess knowledge and experience
integral to the process. The National Park Service (NPS) views
public involvement along a “continuum that ranges from
providing information and building awareness, to partnering in
decision making.” 94
The EPA also views public involvement along a continuum
and has developed a template for considering stakeholder
engagement, consultation, and collaboration. In May 2003, EPA
issued its Public Involvement Policy, 95 which articulates the view
No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004) (fostering “cooperative
conservation” in the federal government); Memorandum from James L.
Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Environmental. Quality, to Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld et al., Implementing Executive Order 13,352 through a
Competency Based Approach to Collaboration and Partnering (Nov. 28, 2005)
(designed to develop competency in collaboration and partnering skills).
91. See Cooperative Conservation, Public Engagement Information
Resources, http://cooperativeconservation.gov/get-involved/linkspublicengageme
nt.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (listing resources and links to federal agency
and department web-based information on collaboration).
92. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV. NAT’L P’SHIP, OFFICE & NAT’L FOREST
FOUND. PARTNERSHIP GUIDE: THE POWER OF PEOPLE WORKING TOGETHER (2005),
http://www.partnershipresourcecenter.org/resources/partnership-guide/Partner
ship-Guide.pdf.
93. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, COOPERATIVE CONSERVATION: SUCCESS THROUGH
PARTNERSHIPS 3, http://www.doi.gov/news/CoopConserv_PRINT.pdf.
94. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, DIRECTOR’S ORDER #75A:
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 5-6 (2007), http://www.nps.gov/
olicy/Orders/75A.pdf.
95. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. &
INNOVATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY OF THE U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
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that effective public involvement can help the EPA to achieve its
mission of protecting human health and the environment while
promoting democracy, civic engagement, and the public trust in
government. 96 Like the Association for Conflict Resolution, 97
EPA identifies three broad categories of public involvement that
go beyond the simple one-way information and outreach
mechanisms used for many government decisions. These broad
categories include exchanging information with the public,
empowering stakeholders to provide recommendations to EPA,
and reaching mutually acceptable decisions with selected
stakeholder representatives. 98 EPA refined the broad categories
and developed a five-point template, discussed in the next section,
for considering collaborative process options.
IV. A FIVE-POINT TEMPLATE FOR CONSIDERING
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING AND
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT WITH NON-FEDERAL
STAKEHOLDERS
EPA published a handbook to build on the three broad
categories by providing detailed guidance to agency officials
pursuing public involvement. 99 The process options included in
the handbook range from limited stakeholder outreach to
empowering public participation in, and even control of, decision
making.
The handbook provides a continuum of public
consultation and collaboration with the following progression of
public involvement categories: (1) outreach; (2) information
In
exchange; (3) recommendations; and (4) agreements. 100
practice, EPA has added a fifth category, referred to as
stakeholder action. The EPA spectrum is modeled after a similar

publicinvolvement/pdf/policy2003. pdf [hereinafter EPA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
POLICY].
96. Id. at 1.
97. See infra Part II.A.i.
98. EPA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY, supra note 95, at 14-18.
99. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 6.
100. Id.
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spectrum developed by the International Association for Public
Participation (IAP2). 101
As the spectrum progresses from outreach to stakeholder
action, we are likely to see an increase in: (1) interaction among
stakeholders; (2) opportunities for creative options; (3) commitment to action; (4) collaborative behavior; and (5) sharing of the
government’s authority to make decisions. In each category,
except “stakeholder action” where the government plays a
supporting role, the government typically retains ultimate
authority to make the decision. However, each category involves
a collaborative process that, at a minimum, informs the
government decision.
As noted earlier, it is very important that when the federal
government involves the public in an important policy issue, such
as climate change, it provides clarity about which category the
action falls into. 102 Failure to provide such clarity may lead to
misunderstanding, mistrust, and expectations that cannot be
met. 103 For example, if the government’s goal is simply to
exchange information with stakeholders but isn’t clear about the
limits to the stakeholder process, some participants may expect
that the exchange of information is a preliminary step that will
lead to an opportunity to make recommendations and, possibly,
even enter into agreement with the government.
There are many factors that inform the federal government’s
decisions about which category along the spectrum it chooses for
any particular action. Such factors may include, among others,
time constraints on finalizing a decision, political support within
the agency for a particular process, court orders and judicial
101. See generally INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, IAP2 SPECTRUM OF
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2007), http://www.iap2.org/associations /4748/files/IAP2
%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf (this spectrum has been adopted by other
organizations as well). See, e.g., THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF
COLLABORATION & CONSENSUS ON PUB. ISSUES IMPROVING CLARITY ON
COLLABORATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESSES 4, http://www.mediate.com
/acrepp/docs/Spectrum.pdf.
102. See, e.g., JAMES L. CREIGHTON, DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PUB. ACCOUNTABILITY, HOW TO DESIGN A PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION PROGRAM 6, http://cooperativeconservation.gov/get-involved/DOE
HowtoGuide.pdf.
103. It can also have the effect of diminishing the likelihood of future use of
collaborative processes. See Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best Practices, supra
note 11.
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requirements, regulatory and statutory requirements, stakeholder expertise and depth of experience, and whether the action
is novel or run of the mill. 104 It is important that the government
consider these and other factors via a preliminary internal needs
assessment to, in essence, take the temperature of the agency
regarding its commitment to a collaborative process, before
discussing options with the public. This internal assessment
should be followed by an external situation assessment to gain a
better understanding of the universe of potential stakeholders,
their preferences, perspectives and needs. 105
The external
situation assessment will help to ensure that the most
appropriate process category along the spectrum is selected.
The next section presents examples of collaborative decisionmaking and stakeholder engagement on climate change involving
the federal government using EPA’s public engagement and
collaboration spectrum. It should be noted that, while there are
five elements of the spectrum, the lines between these elements
are often blurred in that a particular collaborative process may
fall into more than one element. Nonetheless, the spectrum
serves as a useful vehicle for considering the kinds of
collaborative processes that can be used to address climate
change. As reflected in the discussion below, there are already
many examples of collaborative efforts on climate change
involving the federal government, and there are, no doubt, many
more examples not reflected in this article. While there is no
inventory of all such efforts, the examples below illustrate the
range of collaborative process categories. Given the expected
uptick in climate change action within the federal government,
these categories can serve as a framework for considering options
for future collaborative decision-making.

104. Id. at Appendix 1. The Association for Conflict Resolution provides a
checklist to assist government officials in determining whether they should
proceed with a collaborative process. This same checklist can be used to explore
which category along the spectrum of collaboration to select.
105. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13; see generally The Consensus Bldg. Inst.
& The Land Use Law Ctr., Pace Univ. Law School, Conducting Conflict
Assessments in the Land Use Context: A Manual (2000) (on file with author).
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V. EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION
MAKING ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The examples in this section will begin with the information
exchange category, rather than the less inclusive category of
outreach. Collaborative decision-making implies some process of
working together towards a common end.
Although the
government does work together with stakeholders in a minimal
fashion when conducting outreach, the process is primarily
intended as a mechanism to simply impart information to the
public. 106 As such, this section will provide examples of the
following processes along the spectrum: (1) information exchange;
(2) recommendations; (3) agreements; and (4) stakeholder action.
While these examples are not measured against any particular
metric, they provide lessons-learned on collaborative processes
and illustrate how the spectrum can be used to give consideration
to options for future collaborative decision-making.
A.

Information Exchange

During an information exchange, stakeholders share
information, ideas, and concerns, and have the ability to define
the problem, identify the issues, and discuss options. 107
Information exchange can be done with large or small groups of
stakeholders, by invitation or through an open meeting. While
the goal of information exchange is not to obtain collective group
advice, it is possible to get individual viewpoints on preliminary
government proposals, discuss a range of perspectives, and
improve understanding and communication among stakeTransparency is particularly important in an
holders. 108
information exchange process so that stakeholders are willing to
be candid rather than positional and the dialogue can be open

106. According to the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution,
“[c]ollaboration as a general term describes how people and organizations work
together, literally meaning ‘co-labor.’ There are many ways to collaborate:
informally or formally, as partners or in teams, in advisory capacities or as joint
decision-makers. Collaboration is at the core of ECR [environmental conflict
resolution] processes.” U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, FAQs,
http://www.ecr.gov/Basics/FAQs.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
107. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 9.
108. Id.
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and more productive. 109 The following examples of information
exchange include two climate change rulemaking processes and a
non-regulatory program called the USA National Phenology
Network.
1.

The Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule

On December 26, 2008, in its 2008 Fiscal Year Consolidated
Appropriations Bill, Congress authorized funding for EPA to
propose and finalize a rule on mandatory reporting of greenhouse
gas emissions. 110 This was a very important step for the federal
government because a national approach to mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be effective without first
knowing current emissions by sector and then monitoring the
decline over time. 111 Congress required EPA to issue the
proposed rule under the Clean Air Act by September 26, 2008,
and the final rule by June 26, 2009. 112 The proposal was not
signed until early in the Obama Administration, on March 10,
2009, and published in the Federal Register on April 10, 2009. 113
EPA went well beyond the usual public notice and comment
requirements for rulemaking contained in Section 307(d) of the
Clean Air Act. 114 While no public meetings are required under
109. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. E NVTL . L.J. 269, 286 (2005).
110. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 6, 121 Stat.
1844, 2128 (2008).
111. Problems associated with the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme’s failure to have robust baseline data can be found in, INT’L CLIMATE
CHANGE PROGRAMS, THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOLS’ CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM 17-20 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09151. pdf.
112. EPA was required to:
‘develop and publish a draft rule not later than 9 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, and a final rule not later than 18 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, to require mandatory reporting of GHG
emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy of
the United States.’
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 6, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128
(2008).
113. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448
(proposed Apr. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89).
114. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2006).
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the Clean Air Act before publication of the proposed rule, 115 EPA
conducted extensive outreach and held more than 100 meetings
with over 250 stakeholders, including trade associations,
potentially affected industries, state, local, and tribal government, environmental groups and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA). 116 At these meetings, EPA
shared information about the proposed rule and encouraged input
from the stakeholders. EPA also established technical work
groups that “followed up with stakeholders on a variety of
methodological, technical, and policy issues.” 117
Given the expertise that states and local governments have
developed on many aspects of climate change and the experience
they have had with implementing climate change programs, it is
important that the federal government, in developing climate
change regulations and policies, take advantage of the lessons
learned.
To that end, EPA met with state and regional
organizations already involved in greenhouse gas reporting
programs, such as the California Air Resources Board, The
Climate Registry, and the Western Climate Initiative, 118 and
“benefited from the leadership the States have shown in
developing these programs and their experiences” and built upon
those experiences to develop the proposed Greenhouse Gas
Reporting Rule. 119
EPA held two public meetings on the proposed rule, one in
Arlington, Virginia, and the other in Sacramento, California. 120
115. Under Section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act, EPA is not required to engage
the public before the proposal is published. Id. Upon publication of the proposal
in the Federal Register, EPA is only required to establish a docket and
procedures for viewing the docket, provide a statement of basis and purpose,
and specify the period for public comment and procedures for receiving
comments. Id. § 7607(d)(2)-(4).
116. Mandatory Reporting on Greenhouse Gasses, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,457 (Apr.
10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 86, 87, 89, et seq.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. EPA also benefited from existing federal programs involving
greenhouse gas reporting, such as EPA’s Climate Leaders, Combined Heat and
Power Partnership, SmartWay Transport Partnership voluntary programs,
DOE’s 1605(b) Voluntary Registry, as well as mandatory reporting programs
such as EPA’s acid rain and NOx budget trading programs. Id. at 16,457-16,459.
120. Id. at 16,448.
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The Agency also employed live audio web-streaming for remote
participants in a novel approach to increase stakeholder access to
the public meetings; 121 approximately 150 people took advantage
of this option. 122 Even after publication of the proposed rule,
EPA continued this very active outreach and by late July 2009,
had interacted with several thousands of people through face to
face meetings in both EPA’s headquarters office in Washington,
D.C. and several EPA regional offices throughout the country,
and conducted or participated in approximately ten to twenty
webinars, conference calls, and trade association meetings. 123
The EPA Administrator signed the final rule on September 22,
2009, and EPA used an “open door policy” for public input all the
way through to promulgation of the final rule. 124
While the full benefits of this collaborative approach cannot
yet be measured, this robust 125 form of public participation can be
considered as an alternative to negotiated rulemaking when the
government decides that it lacks the internal or external political
support or time for an agreement-seeking process.
2.

Geological Sequestration Rule

On July 25, 2008, EPA published the Proposed Federal
Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program

121. Telephone Interview with Katherine Sibold, Program Manager, Office of
Atmospheric Programs, U.S. EPA (July 29, 2009). Approximately 200 people
attended in person, indicating that the web-streaming increased attendance by
roughly 75%.
122. Id.
123. Id. All tolled, EPA met with over 4,000 people and 135 groups by the time
the final rule was issued. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA-HQOAR-2008-0508, PREAMBLE TO EPA FINAL RULE, MANDATORY REPORTING OF
GREENHOUSE GASES 19 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads09/Preamble SecI-II.pdf.
124. Id.
125. A detailed discussion of three examples of EPA negotiated rulemaking
and four examples of OSHA negotiated rulemaking can be found in, Charles C.
Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23
HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 141 (1999). See also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein,
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL . L.J. 60
(2000) (suggesting that, based on empirical data, negotiated rulemaking is
superior to conventional rulemaking).
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for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells 126 under the
Safe Drinking Water Act’s Underground Injection Control
program. 127 This proposal was, in part, the product of a
stakeholder process that, like the Greenhouse Gas Reporting
Rule, went beyond the normal statutory public process
requirements.
EPA held two facilitated public stakeholder
workshops, in December 2007, and February 2008, with
participants from industry, environmental groups, utilities,
At the first
academia, States, and the general public. 128
workshop, EPA listened to stakeholders’ perspectives and
concerns and discussed, among other things, the rulemaking
process. 129 In the second workshop, EPA discussed how current
Underground Injection Control (UIC) program elements could be
tailored to geological carbon sequestration and conducted smaller
sessions to discuss key technical issues. 130 A diverse group of
stakeholders engaged in the information exchange, including
states, tribes, local government, water utilities, and associations
in the drinking water and geology sectors. 131 EPA indicated in its
July 25th proposal that “technical discussions and stakeholder
feedback from these workshops were used to inform today’s
proposal.” 132
EPA used an outside facilitator to further its goal of
information exchange 133 during development of the proposed rule
on geological sequestration. In one of the facilitated stakeholder
meetings, EPA recognized the importance of proposing the rule in
an expedited fashion while incorporating new information over

126. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control
Program for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492
(July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146) [hereinafter Federal
Requirements]; see Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26
(2006); Underground Injection Control Program, 40 C.F.R. pt. 144 (2009).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 300(h) (2006); 40 C.F.R. pt. 140-48 (2009).
128. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,501.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC WORKSHOP TO
DISCUSS PROPOSED UIC REGULATIONS FOR GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON
DIOXIDE (2008), http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/page_uic_washingtondc
_feburay2008_summary.pdf.
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time as an adaptive component of the regulation. 134 EPA also
indicated that it may accept new data for consideration after the
rule is written through a notice of data availability and sought
stakeholder input on how to ensure adaptability of the rule. 135
The adaptive approach discussed during the information
exchange was incorporated into the proposed rule as a way to
strike the balance between the fast pace needed for
implementation of geological sequestration and the importance of
tracking
new
data
and
information
gained
during
136
implementation.
One topic of discussion that arose during the information
exchange was whether EPA could develop improved methods for
public participation on UIC permits. In its proposed rule, EPA
sought comment on whether advanced information gathering and
dissemination methods should be employed. 137 Existing public
participation requirements require: a thirty-day notice and
comment period; public notice via newspapers, postings, or
mailings to interested parties; a fact sheet; a statement of basis;
and a summary of the responses to comments. 138 There are also
procedures for public hearings, public meetings, and advisory
EPA acknowledged in the proposal that newer
groups. 139
methods for more robust interaction with the public have become
available, such as “roundtables, constituency meetings, charrettes
(workshops designed to involve the public in a planning or design
process), information gathering sessions, cable TV, and the
Internet.” 140 EPA sought comment on employing newer forms of
public participation requirements and also requested comments
on engaging communities in the site characterization process as
soon as candidate locations for wells are identified. 141 As this
example suggests, an information exchange process can lead to
consideration of issues that go beyond the limited subject matter
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 7.
136. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,522.
137. Id. at 43,523.
138. Procedures for Decisionmaking Decisions Making, 40 C.F.R. § 124 (2009).
139. Public Participation in Programs Under the Resource Conservation
Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R.
§ 25.5-25.7 (2009).
140. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,523.
141. Id.
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of the rule and assist the government to more broadly improve
public participation. It can also lead to a dialogue about using
adaptive management in climate change decision making.
3.

USA National Phenology Network

As illustrated by EPA’s approach to public participation for
the Greenhouse Gas Reporting rule and the Geological
Sequestration rule, information exchange can occur in the context
of one agency seeking input from diverse stakeholders so that the
agency can make better decisions on climate change. Another
type of information exchange occurs when multiple stakeholders
come together in a non-regulatory context to enter into a
collaborative process for gathering and sharing information
without any single entity being in a lead role or decision-making
capacity. An example of this context is the USA National
Phenology Network, which brings together a wide range of
stakeholders including, federal agencies, state and local
governments, citizen scientists, non-profit groups, educators, and
students to monitor the impacts of climate change on plants and
animals in the United States. 142
Phenology is the study of recurring plant and animal life
cycle events, such as “leafing and flowering of plants, maturation
of agricultural crops, emergence of insects, and migration of
birds.” 143 These life cycle events have been shifting as a result of
climate change. The USA National Phenology Network uses the
power of the Internet to empower stakeholders to enter
phenological observations into an online database that can be
used to assist decision-makers in responding to climate change.
Among the many partners in this effort are several federal
agencies, including the EPA, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Forest Service. 144 It is worth
noting that the USA National Phenology Network was not the
142. National Phenology Network, http://www.usanpn.org/ (last visited Nov.
26, 2009).
143. Id.
144. National Phenology Network USA-NPN Partner Relationships,
http://www.usanpn.org/?q=npn_partners (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). The federal
agencies provide a wide range of support, including the Network’s cyber
infrastructure, planning and implementation workshops, pilot programs, as well
as programmatic support for education and outreach.
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collective brainchild of these agencies. Rather, it was initiated by
two individuals, one from academia and one from the U.S.
Geological Survey. 145 The founding of this network illustrates
that opportunities for collaborative decision-making on climate
change involving federal partners can be initiated by experts and
institutions both outside and inside the federal government.
Given the broad range of knowledge in academia, the private
sector, and state and local governments, the federal government
can look for opportunities to engage in collaborative decisionmaking on projects initiated by non-federal entities.
B.

Recommendations

The recommendations process differs from information
exchange in that it is intended to draw upon the collective
viewpoint or recommendation 146 of a group of diverse
stakeholders, typically selected by EPA to represent a balance of
different interests. 147 The group will make recommendations
based upon a consensus, majority vote, or some combination of
the two. Both EPA and the stakeholders enter this process
understanding that the recommendations might not be fully
adopted by EPA and, even if adopted, EPA’s decision might not be
fully supported by the stakeholders. 148
An excellent example of the recommendations process
involves the Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup (Workgroup),
a subcommittee of the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee formed
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 149 to make

145. This Network was initiated in 2005, when co-founders Mark Schwartz, a
professor at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukie, and Julio Betancourt, a senior
scientist at the U.S. Geological Survey, independently saw the need for the
Network and teamed up to plan a workshop for developing an implementation
plan. See National Phenology Network, History, http://www.usanpn.org
/?q=history (last visited Nov. 26, 2009); see also National Phenology Network,
Board of Directors, http://www.usanpn.org/?q=board-directors (last visited Nov.
26, 2009).
146. The recommendations process often triggers the requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006) (which can apply
when a federal agency is seeking collective advice).
147. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 11.
148. Id.
149. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.2 § 9(c) (2006).
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recommendations to EPA. 150 The Workgroup was charged with
initiating a one-year process to identify potential barriers and
opportunities under the Clean Air Act to creating incentives for
the
development
and
deployment of advanced coal
Advanced coal technology includes carbon
technologies. 151
capture and sequestration approaches such as Integrated
Gasification Combined Cycle technology. 152 The Workgroup was
also charged with ensuring a diversity of stakeholder views and
perspectives and included, among others, members from utilities,
pollution control providers, coal companies, state and tribal
government, NGOs and environmental organizations, public
utility commissions, academia, consultants, and experts on
carbon capture and storage. 153 EPA, the Department of Energy,
and the Department of Defense participated as non-voting
members of the Workgroup. 154
The Workgroup met in person or via teleconference
approximately fifteen times over the course of one year 155 and
produced a final report in January 2008, with recommendations
to EPA. 156 The Workgroup achieved consensus on thirteen
recommendations, most of which related to reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions through advanced coal technology. In
pursuing consensus on the thirteen recommendations, the
Workgroup agreed, pursuant to a Workgroup Charter (Charter)
to “operate according to a ‘substantial consensus’ principle.” 157
Substantial consensus under the Charter meant that, “not every
member might completely agree with every decision the Work
150. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Advanced Coal Technology Work Group
Background,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_background.html
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2009).
151. Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup-Background and Other Information, http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_background.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2009) (this workgroup is currently inactive).
152. Id.
153. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ADVANCED COAL TECHNOLOGY WORK
GROUP, FINAL REPORT 8-9 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech/2008_01
_final_report.pdf [hereinafter EPA ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP].
154. Id. at 9.
155. See Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup—Past Meetings, http://www.
epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_past.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (agenda and
presentations for each meeting are available for download).
156. EPA ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP, supra note 153.
157. Id. at 9.
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Group made. In those cases, the Work Group attempted to
balance views to the extent possible in reporting on the
recommendation and incorporating alternate viewpoints.” 158
Among the recommendations in the final report was one
involving carbon capture and storage. Specifically, the Workgroup recommended that, given “the potential national
importance of geological sequestration, EPA should designate a
new well class for geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide in its
upcoming UIC rulemaking” under the Safe Drinking Water
Act. 159 This recommendation went beyond the Workgroup’s
original charge to examine barriers and opportunities under the
Clean Air Act and, in part, led to the stakeholder process for the
UIC rule 160 discussed in Part V section A of this article. 161 Thus,
a process in one category along the continuum can lead to
opportunities for collaboration in other categories.
C.

Agreements

Agreement processes are those designed to reach a mutually
acceptable decision through agency/stakeholder consensus that
the parties agree to implement. 162 The agreement may or may
not be legally binding but, regardless, is likely to create a sense of
ownership among the stakeholders that encourages widespread
The classic example of an
support for implementation. 163
agreement-seeking collaborative process is a negotiated
rulemaking. 164 As noted earlier, in light of the potential deluge of
158. Id.
159. Id. at 5.
160. See Robert Brenner, Director, Office of Policy Analysis & Review, Office of
Air, EPA, and Stephen Heare, Director, Drinking Water Prot. Div., Office of
Water, EPA, Presentation at EPA Public Workshop on Geologic Sequestration of
CO2 : Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide Under the Safe Drinking Water
Act’s Underground Injection Program (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.
epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/page_uic_washingtondc_feburay2008_presentations.
pdf.
161. See supra notes 106–45 and accompanying text.
162. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 13.
163. Id. at 14.
164. For a detailed discussion of three examples of EPA negotiated
rulemaking and four examples of OSHA negotiated rulemaking, see Caldart &
Ashford, supra note 125, at 141; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING FACT SHEET (2009), http://www.epa.gov/adr/factsheet
regneg.pdf.

37

SIEGEL

294

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

rulemaking 165 that may flow from climate change legislation,
negotiated rulemaking is an excellent option for collaborative
decision-making.
However, agreement-seeking collaborative
processes arise in quite a wide range of contexts, including
settlement agreements, statements of principles, consensus
permits, among others, as illustrated by the examples below.
1.

Multi-Stakeholder Motor Vehicle Agreement

On May 19, 2009, President Obama set into motion a “new
national policy aimed at both increasing fuel economy and
reducing greenhouse gas pollution for all new cars and trucks
sold in the United States.” 166 The policy is the result of
collaboration between the EPA, Department of Transportation
(DOT), State of California, major automobile manufacturers,
United Auto Workers Union, and leading environmental groups.
According to EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, as reported in
the White House press release on the collaboration:
The President brought all stakeholders to the table and
came up with a plan to help the auto industry, safeguard
consumers, and protect human health and the environment
for all Americans . . . A supposedly “unsolvable” problem was
solved by unprecedented partnerships.
This collaborative effort came about in the context of one of
the most highly contested areas of climate change law and
policy—greenhouse gas regulation of motor vehicles.
The
automobile industry, California, and other states have been in
litigation for years over state greenhouse gas emissions standards
for motor vehicles. 167 Compounding the complexity of the issues
was EPA’s decision in 2008 to deny California a waiver from

165. See supra Part II.B.3.
166. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, President Obama
Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy (May 19, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-AnnouncesNation
al-Fuel-Efficiency-Policy/.
167. For a list of cases involving challenges to vehicle standards, see Columbia
Law School Climate Litigation Chart, http://www.climatecasechart.com/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2009).
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preemption under the Clean Air Act’s motor vehicle provisions 168
and DOT’s delayed promulgation of fuel economy standards
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. 169 As a result of
the collaborative effort that led to the White House
announcement on May 19, 2009, key parties signed letters of
commitment in which they agreed to end litigation regarding
these issues and also committed to specific terms for the vehicle
model years 2009-2016. 170
Unlike the public process that took place in the context of the
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Underground Injection Rule,
the collaboration on control of greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles was done without transparency. While no formal
explanation was provided by the parties about the rationale for
conducting the process in a closed fashion, the complexity of the
issues and longstanding nature of the conflict between the parties
may have made it difficult to successfully collaborate and reach
an agreement using an open process. This suggests that while
transparency may be a positive element of successful collaboration in many contexts, there may be occasions, particularly in
agreement-seeking settings where the dispute between the
parties is already joined, when the primary stakeholders may see
transparency as a deterrent to a successful resolution. A broad
lesson learned from this example is that there is no one “right”
set of tools for each collaborative process along the spectrum.
Rather, the design of each collaborative effort must be tailored to
the specifics of the situation and needs of the parties.
2.

National Climate Change and Wildlife Science
Center

Recognizing the lack of scientific information regarding plant
and animal adaptation to climate change, the U.S. Geological
168. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
169. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 32901 (2006)).
170. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Transportation and Climate at
Regulations and Standards, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (providing the commitment letters, terms of the
agreement and more details about the announcement).
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Survey, the science agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior,
established the National Climate Change and Wildlife Science
Center (NCCWSC) to, among other things, link physical climate
models with ecological and biological responses. 171 The broad
goal of the NCCWSC is to use forecasting products from climate
and other models to assist fish, wildlife, and land managers in
their design of suitable adaptive management approaches for
their programs. 172 In carrying out this broad goal, the NCCWSC
plans to “build on existing regional partnerships to foster joint
decision making and prioritization by scientists and managers. 173
As an early step in furthering the work of the NCCWSC, in
December 2008, the USGS convened a workshop with 200
participants from a broad array of stakeholders including state
and federal agencies, tribal organizations, academia and
NGOs. 174 The workshop sought to “identify research needs and
priorities, devise strategies for partnerships and collaboration,
and to begin to design a structure for the [NCCWSC].” 175
Recognizing the variety of scientific methods to predict impacts
from climate change, one goal of the meeting was to find ways to
“link together different scientific approaches and models for
forecasting the impacts of climate change and adaptation on fish,
wildlife and their habitats.” 176
In order to build on the December 2008 workshop, the USGS
convened a series of regional workshops in spring 2009 to “help
develop the structure of the NCCWSC and partnership
mechanisms needed to link climate science and national resource
The structure was
management in the United States.” 177
envisioned as:
171. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
CTR. (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/NCCWSC-information-031609.pdf
(noting that Congress included $1.5 million in the FY 2008 Appropriations Bill
for USGS to create the Center).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI.
CTR., SUMMARY WORKSHOP REPORT 2 (2008), http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/
NCCWSC_Summary_Work shop_Report.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR.,
EASTERN
REGIONAL
WORK-SHOP,
WORKSHOP
SUMMARY
1
(2009),
http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/NCCWSC_Eastern_Workshop_Summary .pdf.
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[A] collaborative system of NCCWSC Regional Climate
Science Hubs working with a national headquarters and
with external adaptive application partnerships jointly
organized by willing partners. These partnerships would
create feedback loops to inform science priorities and
adaptive resource management at regional and finer
scales. 178
Options for the structure of the NCCWSC and its hubs were
discussed at each of the three regional workshops. 179 Following
the workshops, USGS issued a report outlining how joint
decisions will be made under the umbrella of the NCCWSC. 180
Unlike a negotiated rulemaking or the multi-stakeholder motor
vehicle agreement, which are temporally limited endeavors to
reach one final agreement, the NCCWSC is an example of a
program in which decisions will be made on an ongoing basis by
the parties. This can be particularly powerful in the context of
climate change because it allows for an iterative process that can
support adaptive management. Specifically, an adaptive
management approach can be used to plan for species at risk.
Information from the NCCWSC can assist land managers in
conducting anticipatory adaptation before significant impacts are
experienced. Examples include forest management in advance of
significant species decline, creation of habitat corridors for species
faced with migration, and prohibition of road development that
would fragment habitats. 181 The information can also be used for
reactive adaptation once the impacts have occurred. Examples
include controlling invasive species that have, due to climate
change, gained the opportunity to destroy habitats of native
species, and reintroduction of native species to former habitats. 182
The collaborative structure of the NCCWSC appears to reflect a
concept referred to by one author as “collaborative management,”
178. Id.
179. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR.,
2009 NATIONAL WORKSHOP, WORKSHOP SUMMARY 1 (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/
documents/NCCWSC_2009_National_Workshop_Summary.pdf.
180. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR.,
PROPOSED 5-YEAR STRATEGY (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/doc uments/NCCWSC_
5_year_strategy_ver_7-13-09b.pdf.
181. Glicksman, supra note 40, at 888-91.
182. Id. at 848.
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in which multiple stakeholders operate in a non-hierarchical
cooperative effort to make decisions in response to a shared
problem. 183 This structure will allow NCCWSC stakeholders to
react to changing information and take adaptive measures in
response.
3.

Methane to Markets

The Methane to Markets Partnership (Partnership) is a nonbinding voluntary international framework for reducing methane
emissions by recovering methane gas for use as an energy
source. 184 Methane, which is twenty-five times more potent as a
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, 185 is addressed by the
Partership through a multi-lateral, bi-lateral, and private sector
collaboration to facilitate methane recovery projects in four
sectors: (1) agriculture, in particular, animal waste management;
(2) coal mines; (3) landfills; and (4) oil and gas systems. 186 The
Partnership was launched by the United States in 2004 with
fourteen nations and as of this year, there are thirty partner
nations. 187
A Steering Committee governs the overall policies,
procedures, and framework of the Partnership, provides guidance
to subcommittees, and conducts an annual review of the
The Steering Committee makes
Partnership’s progress. 188

183. See Babcock, supra note 50, at 473 (discussing the federal-state
consensus model, termed “collaborative management” used in the Clean Water
Act’s National Estuary Program).
184. Methane to Markets, About the Partnership, http://www.methaneto
markets.org/m2m2009/about/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). See also
Jeffrey McGee & Dr. Ros Taplin, The Asia-Pacific Partnership and the United
States' International Climate Change Policy, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
179 (2008) (providing information about other voluntary international
partnerships).
185. U.S. ENERGY I NFORMATION ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES
IN THE U NITED S TATES 11 (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/
0573(2007).pdf (based upon the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report).
186. Methane to Markets, http://www.methanetomarkets.org/ (last visited
Nov. 26, 2009).
187. Methane to Markets, Partner Countries, http://www.methanetomarkets.
org/m2m2009/partners/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
188. Methane to Markets, Terms of Reference, http://www.methanetomarkets.
org/m2m2009/about/terms.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
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decisions by consensus and meets at least once each year. 189 It is
comprised of a Chair and twenty member nations. 190 The Chair
is the U.S. EPA Assistant Administrator for Air. 191 Although the
Chair is a United States official, she serves as a neutral
facilitator to help move the Steering Committee toward consensus
in its decision making. 192 Independent of the Chair, the United
States also has a non-neutral member on the Steering Committee
who represents the United States interests. 193 This program is a
model for future partnerships in which nations engage in
facilitated decision making on climate change by consensus.
While major international negotiations, such as the Conference of
the Parties meeting in Copenhagen, present far more complexity
and therefore require more sophisticated process design, 194 there
will be many opportunities for the kind of partnership forged in
the Methane to Markets program.
4. Dallas Sustainable Skylines Initiative
In March 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was
entered into by the EPA, the City of Dallas, and the North
Central Texas Council of Governments, for the purpose of
developing and implementing a three-year partnership known as
the Dallas Sustainable Skylines Initiative (Initiative). 195 The
purpose of this three party Initiative was to promote
sustainability in Dallas (with an emphasis on air quality) through
voluntary programs, and serve as a model for other such
initiatives. 196
189. Id.
190. Methane to Markets, Steering, http://www.methanetomarkets.org/m2m
2009/steering/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
191. Id.
192. Telephone Interview with Paul Gunning, Chief, Non-CO2 Programs
Branch, Climate Change Division, U.S. EPA (June 9, 2009).
193. Id. See also Methane to Markets, Steering, supra note 190.
194. For discussion of some potential issues and options for a Copenhagen
agreement, see Hunter, supra note 10, at 247; see also Annie Petsonk, Docking
Stations: Designing a More Welcoming Architecture for a Post-2012 Framework
to Combat Climate Change, 19 DUKE J. COMP . & I NT 'L L. 433 (2009).
195. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the City of Dallas, and the North Central Texas Council of
Governments (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Dallas Memorandum], available at
http://www.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/documents/mou2007.pdf.
196. Id.
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Prior to development of the Memorandum of Understanding,
the Initiative was kicked off in December 2006 with a two-day
facilitated brainstorming session that resulted in fifty-eight
project ideas. 197 The parties spent the next three months
winnowing down the project ideas to a total of seven. 198 While
climate change was not specifically identified in the
Memorandum of Understanding as one of the purposes of the
Initiative, most of the seven selected projects mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions. The projects include: completion of a greenhouse
gas strategy for Dallas; implementation of a green buildings
project and a renewable energy/energy efficiency outreach
program; replacement of existing taxis with green taxis;
establishment of a program to reduce the urban heat island effect
in Dallas; and provision of on-site technical assistance to industry
on, among other things, energy efficiency. 199
The seven projects were selected on a consensus basis and
defined in the Memorandum of Understanding as a two-thirds
majority, provided that the majority includes the City of
Dallas. 200 The Initiative was started with $250,000 of EPA seed
money which drew another $3.7 million from non-federal
government entities and the private sector, 201 as well as
approximately
twenty
partners
helping
with
project
Not only is this
implementation and advisory services. 202
197. Telephone Interview with James Yarbrough, Climate Coordinator,
Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, EPA Region 6, Dallas, Texas
(May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Yarbrough Interview].
198. Id.
199. See generally Sustainable Skylines—Dallas, Current Projects,
http://www.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/current_projects.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2009).
200. Dallas Memorandum, supra note 195, at 2. While the projects were
selected by the parties to the MOU rather than through an extensive public
process, there was an opportunity for the public to weigh in during the three
month winnowing period. See also Yarbrough Interview, supra note 197.
201. Yarbrough Interview, supra note 197.
202. Sustainable Skylines—Dallas, Sustainable Skylines Partners, http://www
.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/partners.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
While there are only three parties to the agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding provides that “the Parties will seek cooperation with appropriate
State agencies, other federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and
commercial entities on Initiative projects, and, as determined by the Parties,
other participants may join the Initiative in either advisory or Initiative project
implementation roles for particular projects.” Dallas Memorandum, supra note
195, at 2.
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Initiative an example of an agreement process related to climate
change, but it also represents an excellent example of how the
gravitas of the federal government in a climate change initiative
can help bring other stakeholders and funders to the table. 203 It
also illustrates that the federal government does not always need
to be the key decision maker in collaborative processes
particularly when, as in this case, the process does not stem from
federal regulatory authority. In this example, the two-thirds
majority had to include the City of Dallas, not EPA, because the
primary goal was to assist the City of Dallas with sustainability
planning. Nonetheless, the federal government can play an
important role in partnership opportunities of this kind. This
example also highlights the fine line that sometimes exists
between agreement processes involving the federal government
and stakeholder action processes, discussed in the next section, in
which the federal government plays a support role for external
parties seeking agreement.
D. Stakeholder Action
The stakeholder action category differs from the prior
categories in that the government’s purpose in initiating the
collaborative process is to empower stakeholders to take their
own action, rather than to collaborate with the government on a
government led decision. This approach puts the agency in the
role of a catalyst for action that will be taken collaboratively by
other parties. 204 One of the most effective ways that the federal
government can promote climate change mitigation and
adaptation is to empower non-federal stakeholders through a
variety of support mechanisms. Many agencies have particular
expertise with greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation tools
such as downscale modeling, greenhouse gas emissions
inventories, and emissions reduction measures. Federal agencies
203. EPA has identified seven keys to successful collaborative problemsolving. One of those keys is to have a “convener of stature” to “catalyze
collaboration by legitimizing the process, encouraging stakeholder participation,
and shouldering initial organizational costs to bring parties together to address
a shared problem.” U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Innovation,
Keys to Successful Collaborative Problem Solving, http://www.epa.
gov/NCEI/collaboration/seven_keys.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
204. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 15
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can therefore provide much needed technical support to state and
local government. In addition, they can provide process support,
for example, by creating networks of state and local governments,
and financial support, through grants and other financial
mechanisms.
There are a host of stakeholder action initiatives that have
been developed by EPA’s Climate Protection Partnerships
Division of the Office of Air and Radiation. One such program is
EPA’s State Climate and Energy Partnership Program, a
voluntary program in which EPA provides tools and analyses to
states seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 205 The
Program was launched with eleven states in 2005 and now
EPA also developed a Guide
includes sixteen states. 206
containing sixteen of the best practices for addressing state
climate and clean energy challenges. 207 Among other things, the
Guide provides process support for states interested in developing
a clean energy and environment action plan. 208 For example, the
Guide includes information on how to create a state collaborative
process, establish goals, identify clean energy policies and
programs, design and evaluate impacts of these policies and
programs and, finally, recommend specific actions for decision
makers. 209 The Guide also references the many tools that EPA
offers or supports to help states assess the benefits of policies
they choose to include in their action plans. 210 These include
tools for modeling energy policy and measuring economic,
environmental and human health benefits. 211

205. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Clean Energy State Partner
Network, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/state
-partnership.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
206. Id.
207. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO
ACTION BEST PRACTICES AND ACTION STEPS FOR STATES (2006),
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents /gta/guide_action_full.pdf.
208. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPING A CLEAN ENERGYENVIRONMENT ACTION PLAN (2006), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/
gta/guide_action_chap2.pdf.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2-6, fig. 2.1.
211. Id. See also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Tools and
Resources, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/tool
s.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
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In addition, EPA established a State Technical Forum to
promote clean energy efforts through peer exchange, expert
presentations, and the sharing of documents. 212 EPA facilitates
this monthly discussion among state energy and environmental
agencies and public utility commissions. Among the titles of
recent monthly forums are Federal Climate Legislation and
Implications for State Energy Offices, State Programs for
Building Local Government Climate & Energy Planning Capacity,
State Clean Energy Approaches to the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and Clean Energy Workforce
Development: Growing Green Jobs to Achieve Climate and Energy
Goals. 213
One of EPA’s more recent initiatives is the Climate Showcase
Communities Grant Program. 214 In its Fiscal Year 2009
Appropriations Bill, Congress authorized EPA to administer a
$10 million competitive grant program for local communities
seeking to implement climate change initiatives. 215 One of the
goals of the program is to develop replicable models that can be
transferred to other communities seeking to address climate
change. 216 EPA will assist the grant recipients with “peer
exchange, training, and technical support.” 217 For example, EPA
will help the communities with reporting metrics and tracking
results, annual training workshops, and brainstorming about
peer ideas. 218 In order to achieve the goal of replicating best
practices, EPA will promote transfer of these initiatives to other
communities through “meetings, conference calls, webinars, and
online discussion forums or collaborative workspaces.” 219 EPA
will use the program as an opportunity to foster collaborative
212. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, State Technical Forum,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/stateforum.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
213. See generally id (for materials from these and other monthly discussions).
214. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Climate Showcase
Communities Grant, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-program s/stateand-local/showcase.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. JULIA ROSENBERG, OVERVIEW OF EPA CLIMATE SHOWCASE
COMMUNITIES GRANT PROGRAM PRESENTATION (Jun. 12, 2009) http://climate
communities.us/documents/showcase_ presentation.ppt.
219. Id.
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processes on climate change in two important ways. First, in its
selection of grant recipients, EPA will favor proposals that “build
and leverage partnerships across multiple stakeholder groups.” 220
Second, EPA intends to use this stakeholder action program in
order to foster a “collaborative partnership between communities
and the federal government.” 221
EPA Regional Offices are also involved in stakeholder action
initiatives. For example, EPA’s Region 1 office in New England
developed the EPA New England Community Energy
Challenge. 222 Region 1 provides technical assistance to communities that agree to: (1) benchmark the energy performance of
municipal buildings and facilities; (2) set a reduction goal of at
least 10%; and (3) promote energy efficiency and renewable
energy to the community. 223 EPA’s Region 10 office in the
Northwest provides greenhouse gas inventory technical support
to state, local and tribal government. 224 Region 10 also provides
technical assistance on energy efficiency and renewable energy
options to stakeholders in their region and donated a half-time
staff person to the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation to support their mitigation and adaptation
activities. 225 As the national climate change program grows, it is
likely that regional offices in EPA and other federal agencies will
take a bigger role in supporting stakeholder action, particularly
on issues, like adaptation, that are more local and regional in
nature. Because of their close contacts with state and local
officials, regional offices of federal agencies can serve as coconveners and facilitators of collaborative decision making
processes on climate change.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Region 1: EPA New England, Community
Energy Challenge: Promoting Energy Efficiency and Renewables in New
England Cities and Towns, http://www.epa.gov/region1/eco/energy/energychallenge.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
223. Model Commitment Letter from [New England Community], to H. Curtis
Spalding, Regional Administrator, EPA New England, http://www.epa.gov/reg
ion1/eco/energy/other/commitment-letter.doc.
224. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 10, REGION 10 STRATEGIC
ENDEAVOR FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2008),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/ECOCOMM.NSF/0/525ad9b803f0da4c882574340001
3bfb/$FILE/R10%20CE%20&%20CC%20SE%207-30.pdf.
225. Id.
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VI. COLLABORATION AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES
In order to effectively deploy any of the collaborative
processes along the spectrum, from information exchange through
stakeholder action, the federal government must strategically
draw upon its resources. After eight years of an Administration
that did not sufficiently acknowledge or address the seriousness
of climate change, 226 the federal Executive Branch under
President Obama has a lot of catching up to do. Given the
enormity and complexity of the issue, the task at hand is almost
overwhelming. In order to move forward effectively and marshal
limited resources efficiently, collaboration among the federal
agencies is essential.
As noted by Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the challenge of climate change “will
require an unprecedented level of coordination among federal
agencies, along with our nongovernmental partners, to
accomplish the goal of providing high quality, climate information
and services that are user-friendly, responsive and relevant.” 227
Collaborative decision-making across multiple agencies with
different missions will not be easy. Agencies are funded
individually by Congress and each one has unique statutory
mandates they must fulfill. Thus, agencies may be resistant to
expending resources on joint efforts and have difficulty
overcoming a reflexive resistance to sharing their authority. 228
Agencies are accustomed to going through their own deliberative
process before announcing their thinking not only to the public
but, to other federal agencies.
This tendency against
226. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive
Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2008) (arguing that the federal Executive during
the Bush Administration moved from simple inaction to outright
obstructionism).
227. Written Testimony of Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Under Secretary of Commerce
For Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Sept. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/Testimony/Lubchenco091609.pdf.
One commentator likened the complexity of the coordination required on climate
change to the complexity that inspired creation of the Department of Homeland
Security. See Rabe, supra note 57, at 790.
228. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Thirty-fourth Annual
Administrative Law Issue Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J.
795, 900 (2005).
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transparency derives, in part, from fears about over-committing
resources. It also results from painful experiences with press
coverage, and the resulting political fallout, prior to completing
agency decision-making processes. Therefore, to be successful,
each agency will need sufficient resources and institutional
capacity specifically for collaborative efforts on climate change,
and to be able to overcome differences in bureaucratic cultures. 229
They will also need to embrace a more transparent decision
making process that is necessary for effective collaborative
processes.
Notwithstanding the challenges of coordination, no single
agency can adequately address climate change on its own and,
therefore, collaborative approaches within the federal family can
help each agency achieve its mission. There are many functions
performed by the federal Executive Branch to address climate
change, such as observations, monitoring, modeling, research,
assessments, resource risk management, adaptation, and
mitigation. Each of these functions may be performed by
different agencies with somewhat different goals using a variety
of approaches and techniques.
Recognizing the absence of a national program to monitor
climate trends and issue predictions to support decision makers,
the National Academy of Sciences has identified, as one of its key
recommendations on climate change, the need to coordinate
federal efforts to meet the growing demand for credible,
understandable, and useful information. 230 In many circumstances, a particular function of one agency cannot be adequately
performed without information derived from another agency. For
example, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) may
decide to address the need for adaptation by increasing the size of
culverts under federal highways to prepare for projected extreme
precipitation events. In order to properly design the culvert size,

229. Kerry E. Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance: Homeland
Security and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 157,
233-34 (2007) (casting doubt on whether agencies can share leadership in a
collaborative governance context).
230. COMM. ON STRATEGIC ADVICE ON THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI.
PROGRAM, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL CLIMATE
RESEARCH TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2009), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12595#toc.
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FHWA may need to obtain downscale modeling 231 performed by
NOAA that projects the extent and frequency of those extreme
precipitation events.
Likewise, if both agencies engage in
modeling to project extreme precipitation events but use different
models, collaboration could assist them both in determining
which model will best predict the adaptation needs of a particular
situation.
Moreover, when state and local governments, as well as other
stakeholders, seek data, modeled results, research results, and
assessments from the federal government, a coordinated response
that takes into account the wealth of knowledge of all the
agencies will, in many situations, be more user-friendly and
robust than a disparate set of responses from multiple agencies.
In addition, efforts to reduce the greenhouse gas footprint of the
federal government itself could benefit from collaboration among
the agencies. Finally, federal agency resources are already
stretched to the maximum even without the enormous task ahead
on climate change. 232 Coordination will be an efficient way of
leveraging limited resources.
Some efforts are already underway to initiate collaboration
within the federal government. A meeting, entitled Adapting to
Climate Change in the Southeast was held in Charleston, South
Carolina in May 2008. 233 Among the important issues identified
during the breakout sessions were the need for better
communication among the agencies on climate change
adaptation, the benefit of providing a unified message from all
the agencies while recognizing each agency’s particular niche, the
need to communicate inherent uncertainties in climate change

231. Scientists take global models and “downscale” them to predict local and
regional conditions.
232. Rabe, supra note 57, at 790.
233. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Southeast Natural Res.
Leadership Group, Adapting to Climate Change in the Southeast, Agency
Presentation (May 27-29 2008), http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/pdfs/
NOAA%20NMFS%20Final%20Payne%20CC%20SENRLG%20052708.ppt. See
also Northeast Reg’l Ocean Council, Interagency Workshop, New England
Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change in the Northeast 1
(May 29, 2009), http://community.csc.noaa.gov/nroc/index.php?option=com_doc
man&task=cat_view&gid=50&limit=5&limitstart=0&order=name&dir=ASC&It
emid=55.
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data and modeling, and the importance of providing better
downscale modeling to meet state information needs. 234
In June 2009, a meeting of northeast regional federal agency
officials was held to discuss roles and responsibilities with respect
to climate change adaptation. 235 The purpose of the meeting was
to “establish a foundation for federal agencies with climate
related responsibilities to communicate and collaborate effectively
and efficiently” 236 on climate change adaptation. The meeting
participants identified a number of key issues for coordination
including developing “regional consensus on climate scenarios,
data sets, models, and projections for New England.” 237 Included
among the many important collaborative opportunities identified
in the breakout sessions were: (1) working with stakeholders to
identify their needs; (2) coordinating monitoring efforts across
agencies; (3) conducting sea level rise mapping / bridging
communication gaps; (4) forming an interagency group on
knowledge sharing; and (5) identifying the most important
indicators required for modeling climate change effects. 238
Perhaps one of the most significant issues identified as needing
regional federal collaboration was downscaling climate
predictions to spatial and temporal scales meaningful to decision
makers in the regional area. 239
In the Pacific Northwest, EPA, USGS, NOAA, the National
Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently
formed the Pacific Northwest Climate Change Collaboration (C3)
to, among other things, strengthen federal coordination on
234. SOUTHEAST NAT ’L RES . LEADERSHIP G ROUP , BREAKOUT SUMMARIES AND
REPORT OUT & NEXT STEPS FROM REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
(2008), http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/pdfs/ClimateSENRLGBreakoutGr
oupReportsCombined05302008.pdf.
235. New England Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change
in the Northeast, Full Agenda (June 2-4, 2009), http://community.csc.noaa.gov
/nroc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=50&limit=5&limitsta
rt=0&order=name&dir=ASC&Itemid=55 (scroll down to “Full Agenda_NE
Interagency Climate Meeting”).
236. Id.
237. New England Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change
in the Northeast, Workshop Summary (June 2-4, 2009), http://community.csc.
noaa.gov/nroc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=50&Itemid=
55 (scroll down to “NE Interagency Climate Workshop Summary Report”).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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climate change, align resources, and exchange and coordinate
C3 has
regional tools, data, and scientific knowledge. 240
identified four initial projects they will undertake, including: (1)
comparing existing agency policy and guidance on how to account
for climate change impacts; (2) defining time and scale for climate
change analyses; (3) conducting an inventory of research, tools,
assessments, and downscaled global climate models; and (4)
providing education and outreach materials. 241
In addition to the above-referenced regional efforts, on
August 22, 2008, EPA and the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Interior, and Agriculture entered into an interagency
memorandum to cooperate on adaptation management of waterrelated consequences of climate change. 242 Recognizing the
impacts from rising sea levels, changes in rain and snow levels,
and storm intensity, the memorandum empowers agency senior
staff to coordinate on four items: (1) the sharing of water-related
climate change information and data; (2) the exchange of
information about climate change programs and activities related
to water; (3) the consideration of research priorities related to
climate change and water; and (4) the cooperative
implementation of water-related climate change adaptation
programs and projects. 243
It is likely, however, that adequate collaboration within the
federal government will not be fully realized without a central
coordinating body. The National Research Council has
recommended a national initiative for climate-related decision
support that “will require unusually effective collaboration among
many federal agencies” and “will demand strong leadership from

240. C3 Overview, Pacific Northwest Climate Change Collaboration (June
2009) (on file with author).
241. Id.
242. Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator of
Water, EPA, to Agency Senior Staff on Federal Agency Cooperation on
Adaptation of Water-Related Programs to the Impacts of Climate Change 1
(Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/water/climatechange/docs/
Agency_Senior_Staff_Fed_Agency_Coop_re_Adaption_of_Water-Related_Progra
ms.pdf.
243. Id.
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the Executive Office of the President, including the science
adviser and the new coordinator of energy and climate policy.” 244
Recognizing the importance of a coordinated effort within the
federal government, the American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009, passed by the House of Representatives, includes a
provision for a National Climate Service. 245 Pursuant to Section
452(d) of the bill, the President is required to initiate a process
through the National Science and Technology Council and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy to evaluate alternative
structures to support “a collaborative, interagency research and
operation program.” 246 The goal of the program is to “meet the
needs of decision makers” within the federal government as well
as state, local, tribal and regional government entities and other
stakeholders “for reliable, timely, and relevant information
related to climate variability and change.” 247 Section 342 of a
Senate bill, introduced by Senators Kerry and Boxer on
September 30, known as the Clean Energy Jobs and American
Power Act, also would create a National Climate Service. 248 A
more comprehensive bill to establish a National Climate Service
was introduced in the House of Representatives in May 2009. 249
Pursuant to that bill, the National Climate Service would, among
244. PANEL ON STRATEGIES AND METHODS FOR CLIMATE-RELATED DECISION
SUPPORT; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING DECISIONS IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE 6 (2009) available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
12626&page=1. President Obama appointed Carol Browner as the coordinator of
energy and climate policy (“climate czar”) in the new White House Office of
Energy and Climate Change Policy. Other key players on climate change within
the Administration are Lisa Jackson (EPA Administrator), Dr. Steven Chu
(Secretary of Energy), Nancy Sutley (Chair of White House Council on
Environmental Quality), and John Holdren (White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy). See Press Release, White House, President Elect Barack
Obama Announces Key Members of Energy and Environment Team (Dec. 15,
2008), available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_
obama_announces_key_members_of_energy_and_environmen/.
245. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
§ 331 (1st Sess. 2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives on June 26,
2009).
246. Id. § 452(d).
247. Id. § 452(d)(1)(A).
248. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/cleanenergyjobsandameric
anpower/pdf/bill.pdf.
249. National Climate Service Act of 2009, H.R. 2407, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2407.
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other things, be charged with coordinating with federal agencies
and collaborating with state, local, and tribal governments,
academia,
nonprofits,
the
private
sector
and
other
stakeholders. 250
Whether or not a climate bill succeeds in Congress and a
National Climate Service is established, the federal government
must build capacity in collaborative decision making by vastly
increasing the number of staff capable of planning and
facilitating collaborative processes on climate change. While
there appears to be recognition that skilled facilitation of decision
making processes is valuable, the benefits will not be fully
realized without a sufficient commitment of resources. Adequate
funding for collaborative decision making planners and
facilitators should be complemented by a new institutional
structure that creates a network for coordination within the
federal government. The effort should take place across the
agencies to foster both interagency coordination and outside
stakeholder collaborative opportunities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Institutional change can sometimes come very slowly to the
federal government, even when new leadership has indicated a
strong intention to shift the manner in which business is done. 251
The long-standing way of making decisions through traditional
rulemaking and other non-collaborative processes is embedded in
agency culture and will require a significant push toward new
approaches. EPA has developed a template of collaborative
processes along a continuum of increasing public involvement.
This template can serve as a useful model as the federal
government begins to consider the range of options for engaging
with stakeholders in collaborative decision making on climate
change. Climate change-specific examples of these collaborative
processes already exist and lessons learned from these examples
can be a basis for exploring and successfully implementing
additional opportunities. In light of the unique challenges of
climate change and specific reasons why collaborative decision
making can be particularly helpful to government decisions on
250. Id.
251. Freeman, supra note 19, at 13-14.
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climate change, the federal government should build its capacity
to engage in collaborative processes. This will require new ways
of engaging with outside stakeholders and a new framework for
interagency collaboration.
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